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Abstract 
In the past decades self-employment has gained importance in both countries Germany 
and the United Kingdom. In particular the proportion of solo-self-employment shows an 
increasing trend. This development has created new challenges for social risk 
management strategies. It raises the question of whether and to what extent the national 
social security systems for the self-employed are working and are capable of dealing 
with the new situation.  
To answer this question, the paper evaluates Germany´s and the United Kingdom´s 
legislation on the social protection of self-employment. Furthermore the collective 
representation of interests of the self-employed e.g. through trade unions is described. 
Finally, private provisions for retirement are outlined as an example for individual risk 
management strategies of the self-employed.  
Zusammenfassung 
Sowohl in Deutschland als auch im Vereinigten Königreich hat die selbstständige 
Erwerbsarbeit in den letzten Dekaden an Bedeutung gewonnen. Vor allem der Anteil an 
Solo-Selbstständigkeit ist stetig gestiegen. Diese Entwicklung ist mit neuen 
Herausforderungen an ein soziales Risikomanagement für die zuständigen Akteure und 
Institutionen verbunden. Es stellt sich die Frage, ob und in welcher Form die staatlichen 
Sicherungssysteme, kollektive Interessenvertretungen und die Individuen selbst auf 
diese Herausforderungen eingestellt sind. 
Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werden als Beispiele für kollektives 
Risikomanagement die Einbeziehung der Selbstständigen in die jeweiligen nationalen 
sozialen Sicherungssysteme mit Schwerpunkt der Absicherung des Risikos Alter sowie 
die Interessenvertretung durch Organisationen und Verbände beschrieben. Als ein 
Beispiel für individuelles soziales Risikomanagement wird am Ende die private 
Vorsorge der Selbstständigen fürs Alter im Ländervergleich skizziert.  
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1 Introduction 
The “rebirth” of self-employment is one of the most significant developments to have 
taken place on contemporary labour markets. Following a continued decline in the share 
of workers in self-employment in almost all developed countries until well into the 
second half of the 20th century, the last few decades have brought a return to this type of 
work, which is now expanding in almost all countries. This “renaissance of self-
employment” has affected countries with a historically high share of self-employment 
(such as the countries of southern Europe) and those with a historically low share (such 
as the Scandinavian countries) in equal measure. 
Germany and the United Kingdom are two countries whose self-employment rates 
lie in the bottom half of the comparative ranking for Europe. In 2003, around 10% of all 
workers were self-employed in Germany, while the share was around 12% in the UK 
(the EU average amounted to 15%: OECD 2004). Nonetheless, the renewed growth in 
self-employment has been particularly strong in these two countries compared to the 
rest of Europe. 
The fact that Germany and the UK are both experiencing marked growth in self-
employment is notable for the following reasons. The two countries are very dissimilar 
not only with respect to the structure of their labour markets, but also as regards the 
regulation of labour market and social policy. The UK can be considered a liberal 
welfare state with not very highly regulated, uncoordinated labour markets. “Soft” 
labour legislation and low levels of social insurance have favoured the development of 
flexible types of employment that diverge sharply from standard employment 
arrangements. As a result, the employment situations of a large share of workers are 
both relatively flexible and at the same time precarious. Labour law in Germany, by 
contrast, is embedded in the corporatist structure of a conservative welfare society. 
Here, labour legislation and the social insurance system offer individuals a 
comparatively high degree of protection and insurance against social risks. 
The significant increase in self-employment in these two countries with their very 
different labour markets and welfare state frameworks gives rise to the following 
questions. Which similarities and which differences can be identified in the respective 
upward trends for self-employment? And to what extent do the different welfare state 
contexts shape social risk management? 
The concept of social risk management is helpful here because its aim is not only to 
deal with risk events that have occurred – in the sense of traditional (social) insurance 
systems. In addition to risk treatment, the concept also takes two further strategies – risk 
prevention and risk mitigation – into account (Holzmann/Jorgensen 2000, Schmid 
2006). Thus, in correspondence to the dynamics of risks, the entire spectrum of options 
for action is considered. In the area of self-employment, the possibilities for action 
range from advice on business foundation and lobbying or interest representation 
provided by associations (risk prevention) through informal networks and tax 
concessions for investments (risk mitigation) to statutory or private pension insurance 
(risk treatment). 
The concept of risk management is also concerned with the question as to who 
should be responsible for dealing with risks, and in accordance with which rights and 
obligations. “This means no more, but also no less, than calling into question the (old) 
ingrained division of the labour of risk treatment between individual, family, company, 
association and state, and adjusting its structure so as to better reflect the evolution of 
risks” (Schmid 2004: 6). 
The following analyses are based not so much on the theoretically analytical as on 
the empirically analytical foundations of social risk management. The point of departure 
is risk analysis: Are there specific, new risks facing the (new) self-employed? What is 
the structure of the division of responsibility between actors who deal with risks? Are 
collective or individual social risk strategies more significant? 
In order to answer these questions, first the structure and the development of self-
employment is briefly outlined for both Germany and the UK. In the next step, 
similarities and differences between the two countries with respect to the growth of self-
employment are highlighted. As an example of collective social risk management in the 
treatment of risks the inclusion of the self-employed in the two countries’ social 
insurance systems is described with an emphasis on provision for old age. While social 
insurance represents the classic case of dealing with risk events that have already 
occurred, collective interest representation stands for strategies of risk prevention and 
risk mitigation. The following discussion will reveal whether and to which extent the 
policies of bodies that represent collective interests – such as trade unions – make 
reference to collective risk management for the self-employed. Moreover, private 
provision for old age will also be described as an example of individual risk 
management. Whether and in which way self-employed workers in the two countries 
feel they are protected against risks through the statutory systems and whether and in 
which form they have made private provisions for old age are the final questions dealt 
with in this paper. 
2 Development and structure of self-employment  
As in many other countries, the “renaissance of self-employment” began in the UK in 
the 1980s. In that decade, the UK had one of the strongest growth rates for self-
employment in Europe. Taken as a share of total employment, self-employment rose 
from 7.1% in the period 1973–1977 to 12% in the period 1998–2002 (see Figure 1).  
After 1997, the self-employment rate declined sharply again, and by 2000 it had 
already fallen to the level reached in 1984 (11.3% and 11.2%, respectively) 
(Meager/Bates 2004: 137). Following a lengthy period of stagnation and decline, self-
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employment has been rising robustly again in recent years. In January 2005, 12.5% of 
the working population was self-employed (Boden 2005). 
Figure 1: Shares of self-employed in Germany and the United Kingdom 
(Self-employed with and without dependent employees as a percentage share of the working 
population. The values represent the average annual shares for the period indicated. 
Agricultural sector not included). 
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Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics, author’s calculations. 
In Germany, the renaissance of self-employment set in about ten years after the other 
European countries, in other words not until the early 1990s. The share of the working 
population in self-employment rose here from an average 7.5% in the period 1978–1982 
to 9.4% in the period 1998–2002 (Schulze Buschoff 2005: 66). 
According to the German micro census, in 2000 the total number of self-employed 
(including the agricultural sector) amounted to 3.643 million persons, 3.089 million of 
whom lived in the territory of the former West Germany and 0.554 million of whom 
lived in eastern Germany (Betzelt 2004: 13). According to OECD data, by 2003 the 
self-employment rate in Germany had risen to 10.4% (OECD 2004). While the trend for 
the self-employment rate has stagnated or begun to decline in some other European 
countries over the last few years, in Germany the growth of self-employment has 
continued uninterrupted (Schulze Buschoff/Schmidt 2005: 533).  
3 Comparing and contrasting Germany and the United Kingdom  
National labour market policy programmes that promote business start-ups on the part 
of the unemployed have been decisive for the increase in the self-employment rate in 
both Germany and the UK. In Germany, labour market policy measures such as the 
“Me, Inc.” business start-up scheme and the bridging allowance for new entrepreneurs 
have particularly gained in importance in recent years. Whereas the year 1994 saw only 
less than 37,000 subsidised business start-ups, by 2004 this figure had risen to over 
350,000 (Caliendo et al. 2006). Since 2003, well over half of all new entrepreneurs have 
been subsidised by the employment agency – compared to not even 10% at the 
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beginning of the 1990s (Kritikos/Wießner 2004). The introduction of the business start-
up grant (under the “Me, Inc.” scheme) on 1 January 2003 as part of the Hartz reforms 
was one of the decisive factors behind this development. In addition to the bridging 
allowance for new entrepreneurs, which has existed since 1986, a second support 
instrument for unemployed workers seeking to become self-employed has thus become 
available. 
In the UK, too, the fact that the active labour market policy pursued in the 1980s in 
particular helped unemployed workers enter self-employment further contributed to the 
self-employment boom. During the period of Conservative government (1979–1997), 
the concept of “enterprise culture” was actively promoted. At the time, the Enterprise 
Allowance Scheme (EAS) was one of the most costly programmes of its kind in Europe. 
Although the evaluation of these measures has shown that the funds invested only led to 
a limited extent to long-term self-employment for the unemployed (Meager et al. 1996), 
the measures undoubtedly nonetheless contributed to a short-term increase in self-
employment during the late 1980s. There have been few government initiatives 
promoting self-employment since the late 1990s, however. Instead of supporting new 
business foundations, public policy is now giving greater priority to the maintenance of 
existing small businesses. The expansion of the construction sector and the “credit 
boom” also contributed to the rise in the UK self-employment rate in the 1980s. 
A glance at the situation in the various economic sectors reveals substantial 
differences between the two countries. For example, a much larger share of self-
employed are found in the construction sector in the UK than in Germany. Almost a 
third of all workers in the UK construction sector were self-employed in 2001, 
compared to only about every eighth construction worker in Germany (see Figure 2, 
p. 6). The share of self-employed in the construction sector has risen perceptibly in both 
countries since then, amounting in 2004 to no less than 16% in Germany and to 37% in 
the UK. The shares of self-employed have also risen in the financial, enterprise and 
other service sectors – in the UK from 15% in 1995 to over 17% in 2001 and to 18% in 
2004, and in Germany from 16% in 1995 to 17% in 2001 and to 19% in 2004. Only the 
education and health sector showed stagnating or only slightly increasing shares during 
the period 1995–2004 (stagnation at around 6% in the UK and a slight increase from 7% 
to 8% in Germany). 
While the category of the self-employed is characterised to a greater extent in the 
UK by low-skilled sub-contractors, in Germany there is a high share of academics 
amongst the self-employed (Strohmeyer 2003: 105–106). Moreover, the number of part-
time self-employed is much higher in the UK than in Germany. 
Despite these differences, some common features can be identified. Structural 
trends such as the growing importance of the service sector, the evolution of contractual 
arrangements in favour of franchising and outsourcing, and the trend towards smaller 
enterprise sizes contributed in both countries to the self-employment boom. And the two 
countries also have an increase in “new self-employment” in common whose 
protagonists do not correspond to the image of the traditional entrepreneur in the small 
and medium-sized business sector. The “new self-employed” are in all probability 
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women who were previously unemployed. They often work as own-account self-
employed in highly competitive service sectors with low entry barriers and low capital 
requirements (Meager/Bates 2001; Schulze Buschoff 2004). A characteristic feature of 
the structural transformation in both countries is the trend towards own-account self-
employment: since 2003, three quarters of all self-employed have been own-account 
self-employed in the UK, while in Germany the share is about one half (Schulze 
Buschoff 2004). 
The growth of self-employment is remarkably dynamic in both countries. Self-
employment is an extremely unstable form of employment which increasingly 
represents a transitional phase in the life course of workers in both Germany and the 
UK. In other words, frequent transitions in and out of self-employment and into and out 
of other forms of employment or unemployment are a constituent part of the 
employment biographies of a rising share of the population (Uhly 2002: 206; 
Meager/Bates 2004; Betzelt/Fachinger 2004; Schulze Buschoff/Schmidt 2005). 
Analyses of income distribution show that the two countries also share a broader 
income spread for the self-employed compared to dependent employees (Meager/Bates 
2001; Uhly 2002; Betzelt/Fachinger 2004). In the UK, the probability of a very low 
income increases with self-employment. Here, too, past phases of self-employment also 
increase the probability of having a very low income in the later stages of the life 
course, especially after retirement age (Meager/Bates 2001: 27). In Germany, too, 
higher shares of income earned from self-employment are found in the lower income 
classes than is the case for income earned from dependent employment 
((Betzelt/Fachinger 2004: 324). Irregular and often low incomes as well as dynamic 
employment biographies are specific risks that have accompanied the self-employment 
boom in both countries. 
Figure 2: Self-employment trends in selected sectors  
(Total self-employed with and without dependent employees as a percentage share of total 
workers in a sector; classifications in accordance with NACE Rev. 1.) 
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4 Self-employment and collective social risk management 
4.1 Integrating the self-employed into the social insurance systems  
The specific risks related to the growth in self-employment that have been outlined 
above present new challenges to the actors and institutions responsible for social risk 
management. As institutions concerned with risk treatment, the state social security 
systems are directly called on here. The question as to whether and in which manner 
they also cover the self-employed – that is, whether and how they meet these particular 
risks – will be dealt with in the following. 
4.1.1 United Kingdom  
The social security system in the UK is based on the fundamental principles of the 
Beveridge Plan of 1942. Under the terms of the Beveridge Plan, mandatory, 
contribution-based social insurance would offer security against income loss in the 
event of the risks of age, illness, maternity, unemployment and widowhood. In addition, 
provisions that were not based on contributions, rather were financed by tax revenue, 
were foreseen for individuals who had made no or only insufficient contributions to 
social insurance. The characteristic features of the Beveridge Plan were the fact that it 
was based on gainful employment, required very low contribution rates and provided a 
minimum level of basic insurance for the entire population. 
Beveridge consciously included the self-employed in his report – and thus gave 
practical form to his recognition that the self-employed are by no means a homogenous 
and affluent category. He also took account of the possibility of people switching 
between self-employment and dependent employment during their working life, or even 
engaging in both forms of employment at the same time. This aspect of the social 
security model based on the Beveridge Plan is quite unique in Europe. It provides 
contributory benefits to the self-employed in accordance with the same principles and 
under the same system as for dependent employees. 
Under the social insurance model founded on the principles of the Beveridge Plan, 
relatively small contributions based on either dependent employment or self-
employment were intended to guarantee an adequate, all-inclusive basic insurance. It 
was against this background that in 1946 the National Insurance Act was ratified and a 
national health service was launched. Since then, the national health insurance system 
has consisted, on the one hand, of the contributory system (only monetary benefits) and, 
on the other, of the tax-financed health service, which provides medical care (only 
benefits in kind) to the entire population. 
The social security benefits provided in addition to health insurance can be grouped 
in three categories (Devetzi 2003: 393): 1. contributory benefits, which cover the risks 
of old age and death, invalidity, unemployment and pregnancy; 2. non-contributory 
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benefits, which cover the risks of old age and invalidity, are financed from tax revenue 
and are provided to people who are not eligible for contributory benefits; 3. means-
tested benefits, which are also financed from tax revenue but are conditional on proof of 
need. 
Under the state’s contributory insurance system, all workers – both dependent 
employees and self-employed – who are resident in the UK and whose income exceeds 
certain minimum levels, are covered by mandatory insurance. The self-employed pay a 
relatively low contribution rate to the national insurance system (National Insurance 
Contributions). Unlike dependent employees, however, they are not eligible for benefits 
in the event of unemployment or accidents at work (Devetzi 1999: 47–48). 
4.1.2 Germany  
The social insurance introduced in Germany on the initiative of Reich Chancellor 
Bismarck at the end of the 19th century was conceived as a form of security exclusively 
for dependent employees and was based on the principle of contributory financing paid 
in equal parts by the employer and the employee. Today, the Bismarckian social 
security system is funded by means of pay-as-you-go contributions. Pensions serve as a 
replacement for the income that had been subject to mandatory social insurance prior to 
retirement. 
In accordance with the tradition of Bismarckian social insurance, the self-employed 
are largely excluded from membership in the pension insurance system. However, the 
historical development of social insurance in Germany has seen the introduction over 
the course of time of a series of legal regulations that recognised the need of single 
groups of self-employed for protection and incorporated them in the mandatory pension 
insurance system. 
One of these regulations applies to self-employed workers in the cultural sector. In 
view of the particular situation of this category, the Artists’ Social Security Fund 
(Künstlersozialkasse) was created as a welfare-state insurance institution charged 
specifically with providing for the socio-political integration of self-employed artists 
and publicists into the Bismarckian social security system (Betzelt/Schnell 2003: 251).1
There are other exceptions for the so-called liberal professions (e.g., lawyers and 
doctors) and for specific occupational groups such as artisans, agriculturists, teachers 
                                                 
1 On the basis of the Artists’ Social Security Fund, self-employed artists and publicists are insured by 
law in the health and pension insurance systems since 1 January 1983 and additionally in the nursing-
care insurance system since 1 January 1995. The contribution rate is based on the individual’s 
expected annual income expressed in monthly amounts. In the same way as dependent employees, the 
self-employed artists pay half the contribution to the insurance fund, while the other half is covered in 
part by a federal subsidy and in part by the “social security contribution for artists”, which is paid by 
the contractor.  
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and midwives.2 All in all, a minority of around a quarter of all self-employed workers is 
insured under mandatory pension insurance systems (Fachinger/Oelschlaeger 2000: 
165). But even for the occupational groups covered by mandatory insurance, the 
situation is extremely heterogeneous with respect to the various social risks. As regards 
the categories of self-employed workers specified here, mandatory insurance exists only 
with respect to old age and invalidity. In Germany, only agriculturists and artists and 
publicists are subject to mandatory insurance for illness and long-term nursing care 
(Fachinger 2003: 7). 
Self-employed workers who are not subject to mandatory insurance do, however, 
have the possibility – under certain circumstances – of opting for so-called voluntary 
membership in the statutory health insurance system.3 All the statutory health insurance 
funds levy a contribution in the form of a certain percentage – which varies from fund 
to fund – from the income of their members. At the beginning of 2005, the contribution 
rates paid in equal parts by employers and employees amounted to between 11.8% and 
14.6%. The employee alone then also pays an additional premium of 0.9%. 
While dependent employees pay one half of the contribution to health insurance 
and the other is covered by their employers, there is no employer share in the case of 
self-employed who are insured voluntarily under the statutory health insurance system. 
This means that they are obliged to pay the entire contribution to statutory health 
insurance on their own. 
4.2 Statutory insurance against the risk of old age  
4.2.1 United Kingdom  
Statutory pension insurance in the UK is largely restricted to a basic income guarantee. 
At the core of the state pension system is a flat-rate, uniform, contributory basic 
pension.  
                                                 
2 There are mandatory retirement pension systems for: a) homeworkers, teachers, educators, nursing 
staff, midwives, sea pilots, coastal mariners and coastal fishers; (b) artisans listed in the trade register 
of crafts persons and certified chimney sweeps; (c) artists and publicists; (d) agriculturists; (e) liberal 
professionals. The liberal professions – e.g., lawyers, notaries and doctors – have autonomously 
organised systems of insurance and are therefore not members of the statutory social security system. 
3 Whereas the German health insurance system is also open to the self-employed, this has not been the 
case to date for unemployment insurance. Only individuals who have been classified as dependent 
employees following proceedings against them for bogus self-employment must also be insured 
through the employer in the unemployment insurance system. On the basis of a temporary regulation 
that entered into force on 1 February 2006, it is now possible for the first time to request continued 
membership in the unemployment insurance system on a voluntary basis (§28a of Germany’s Third 
Social Security Code [SGB III], valid until 31.12.2010). Under this regulation, people who enter self-
employment following a period of dependent employment can, on request, continue to remain insured 
under the unemployment insurance system. 
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This basic pension is granted to individuals who have paid National Insurance 
Contributions. Dependent employees currently pay a contribution rate of 11% of their 
income, subject to a lower annual earnings limit £ 4,715 and an upper annual earnings 
limit of £ 32,720.4 Earnings that exceed the upper limit are subject to a contribution rate 
of 1%. In addition, employers pay a mandatory contribution equal to 12.8% of the 
earned income of their employees when this exceeds the lower earnings limit of 
£ 4,715. By contrast, self-employed workers pay two types of contribution to the 
system. The first (Class 2) is a standard rate of £ 2.05 per week. In addition, they must 
also pay Class 4 contributions, which amount to 8% of all income between £ 4,715 and 
£ 32,720 per annum and to 1% of all income in excess of £ 32,720 per annum (Boden 
2005: 6). 
Table 1: Comparison of statutory pension insurance systems 
Minimum coverage Standard coverage Additional coverage 
Germany 
No minimum pension, 
means-tested basic 
coverage in old age 
under a separate system. 
Statutory pension 
insurance for dependent 
employees; special 
systems for civil 
servants and certain 
groups of self-
employed; aim is to 
maintain same income 
position in old age. 
Voluntary private 
provision; private 
provision with the 
possibility of state 
subsidies (tax relief) for 
dependent employees 
(Riester pension) and 
for self-employed 
(Rürup pension). 
United Kingdom 
Basic pension system: 
non-contributory old-
age pension equal to 
60% of basic pension; 
supplemented by non-
contributory pension for 
very senior citizens 
(over-80s). 
 
1. Basic pension system 
(almost universal 
coverage) aiming to 
prevent poverty in old 
age. 
2. Obligatory additional 
state pension system 
exclusively for 
dependent employees; 
it is possible to 
“contract out” from 
this system. 
Voluntary private 
provision; state-
regulated forms of 
“contracting out” for 
dependent employees. 
Sources: Boden 2005; Devetzi 2003. 
In 1977, a system of additional state pensions was introduced (the State Earnings 
Related Pensions Scheme – SERPS, renamed the Second State Pension in April 2002), 
which was intended to provide supplementary earnings-related pensions in addition to 
the standard basic pension (Hill 2003: 104). However, the self-employed are excluded 
from this additional pension scheme, and they also have no means of becoming 
voluntary contributors to the system. 
The basic state pension is a flat-rate benefit whose amount is adjusted each year. 
Since its introduction under the 1946 National Insurance Act, the basic pension has 
                                                 
4 The lower annual earnings limit of £ 4,715 corresponds to € 6,944; the maximum limit of £ 32,720 to 
€ 48,191 (exchange rate of 10 September 2006).  
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almost always amounted to less than the minimum subsistence level. In the fiscal year 
2002/03, it was equal to £ 75.50 per week. This sum is only paid in full, however, if 
proof is available of contributions or contribution credits (that cover periods of 
invalidity, illness, maternity or unemployment) for at least 90% of “working life” (49 
years for men and 44 years for women). If the number of “qualifying years” is not 
sufficient, then only a portion of the basic pension is granted. The statutory retirement 
age in the UK is 65 for men and 60 for women (a uniform retirement age of 65 for both 
sexes is to be introduced by 2020). It is not possible to receive an old-age pension in the 
UK prior to retirement age. 
The additional state pension scheme (SERPS or State Second Pension since 2002) 
is a mandatory pension insurance system for dependent employees. Individuals who can 
demonstrate that they are members of an equivalent private pension scheme (i.e., 
persons who have “contracted out”) are exempted from this mandatory system.5 While 
the level of the SERPS pensions depends on actual income, the highest possible SERPS 
pension only amounts to 20% of average earned income (Devetzi 2003: 412). At the 
same time, the full basic pension from the state pension system is currently also less 
than the applicable benefit rates under the state Minimum Income Guarantee for 
pensions. 
This modest level of additional state pensions, the tax incentives that favour 
contracting out and the extremely low level of the basic pension mean that company 
pensions are playing an increasingly important role in the maintenance of workers’ 
standard of living after retirement. The share of pensioners drawing an income from 
company pensions rose from 43% in 1979 to over 60% in the fiscal year 2000/01 (UK 
2002: 37). But the self-employed only have inadequate access to company pension 
plans. Because they are also excluded from the additional state pension system, and 
therefore also from the possibility of contracting out, they rely even more than 
dependent employees on private schemes in order to maintain their standard of living or 
avoid poverty in old age. 
4.1.1 United Kingdom  
The statutory pension insurance system guarantees not only old-age pensions but also 
early retirement pensions for invalidity, as well as widow’s and orphan’s pensions and 
rehabilitation measures following an illness or in the event of a disability. The amount 
of the pension granted depends not only on the contributions paid into the system, but 
also on time spent rearing children, in vocational training or in unemployment. 
                                                 
5 Persons who opt to contract out are then only eligible for the standard-rate basic pension. In the fiscal 
year 1996/97, 76.6% of 20- to 59-year-olds were exempted from the SERPS system. Tax incentives 
have encouraged a growing number of contributors to opt for contracting out. The aim is to relieve 
some of the pressure on the second pillar of the insurance system, which relies on pay-as-you-go 
financing, by using pre-funded systems and transferring increased responsibility for provision for old 
age to individuals themselves (Devetzi 2003: 401). 
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Mandatory membership in the statutory pension insurance system applies across 
the board in Germany for dependent employees who earn at least € 400 per month. In 
contrast to the statutory health insurance system, there is no income threshold beyond 
which individuals are absolved from the obligation to pay insurance contributions. The 
income ceiling that applies to pension insurance – currently a gross income of € 5,200 
per month in western Germany and of € 4,400 per month in eastern Germany – only 
stipulates the upper income limit for the contribution rate of 19.5%. 
In addition to dependent employees, there are also certain groups of self-employed 
who are subject by law to mandatory pension insurance (see Footnote 1 above). 
Membership in a pension scheme run by a professional association is obligatory for the 
institutionalised professions.6 Self-employed individuals who work on a freelance basis 
in the main and in the long term for a single employer (“quasi-employees”) are subject 
to mandatory insurance.7 Likewise, persons receiving the business start-up grant under 
the “Me, Inc.” scheme were subject to mandatory insurance for the duration of the 
benefit.8
A study of the group of self-employed who are subject to mandatory insurance 
shows that on top of the self-employed who are insured in mandatory systems (around 
735,000 people at the end of 1999) and the around 1.9 million self-employed who are 
not subject to mandatory insurance, there are still another around 900,000 self-
employed who are covered by social law but are nonetheless not insured (Fachinger et 
al. 2004: 8–9). “This means that there is currently a relatively high share of people 
amongst those insured by law who – whether by design or unwittingly – are not 
fulfilling their obligation to pay insurance contributions” (Fachinger et al. 2004: 9). 
Self-employed workers who are subject to mandatory insurance under the statutory 
pension system pay a standard contribution which is determined on the basis of the 
current contribution rate of 19.5%. The level of the monthly contribution is calculated 
on principle on the basis of earned income in terms of the reference value.9 The standard 
                                                 
6 Mandatory insurance of this kind exists – in some cases only in individual federal states – for self-
employed doctors, veterinarians, dentists, pharmacists, architects and engineers, lawyers and notaries, 
tax consultants and chartered accountants. 
7 In certain cases, an exemption from mandatory insurance can be granted to quasi-employees, for 
example to new entrepreneurs for the first three years of self-employment and to those aged 58 and 
older.  
8 The business start-up grant (“Me, Inc.”) was a temporary measure that has since expired. Since 1 
August 2006, the terms of a new “start-up grant” are applied in combination with those of the “Me, 
Inc.” grant and the bridging allowance. Under these new regulations, mandatory membership in the 
statutory pension insurance system, which applied to date to “Me, Inc.” entrepreneurs, will be 
abolished. For the first three years of self-employment, “Me, Inc.” entrepreneurs were only obliged to 
pay contributions based on 50% of the reference value (half of the standard rate) without providing 
proof of actual income, in other words € 235.46 in western Germany or € 197.93 in eastern Germany. 
9 One of the bases of assessment for calculating benefits and income thresholds in the social security 
system is the reference value as defined in §18 of Germany’s Fourth Social Security Code (SGB IV). 
This is the average remuneration of all members of the statutory pension insurance system in the 
preceding calendar year, rounded up to the next figure which is divisible by 420. The reference value 
is announced annually and in 2006 amounted to € 2,450 per month (€ 2,065 in eastern Germany). In 
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contribution thus amounts to € 470.93 in western Germany and to € 395.85 in eastern 
Germany. 
Those who earn less than the reference value or would like to insure themselves for 
a higher amount can apply to pay a contribution based on their actual income. In order 
to demonstrate actual income, the applicant must produce his/her most recent tax bill, to 
which subsequent average wage increases are added on. The ascertained actual earned 
income is then multiplied by the contribution rate of 19.5%. Earned income is defined 
as the profit from the self-employed activity, which is calculated in accordance with the 
general procedures for profit assessment under income-tax law. Contributions are paid 
only out of earned income that does not exceed an upper limit of € 5,200 in western 
Germany and € 4,400 in eastern Germany. This results in a maximum pension insurance 
contribution of € 1,014 in western Germany or € 858 in eastern Germany. The 
minimum rate is calculated in both parts of Germany on the basis of earnings of € 400, 
which results in a monthly contribution of € 78. 
In contrast to dependent employees, who pay only half of the contribution to 
pension insurance because the other half is provided by the employer under the system 
of equal financing by the two parties, self-employed workers subject to mandatory 
insurance under the statutory system have no employer’s share. This means they have to 
pay the entire contribution to pension insurance on their own, which represents a 
substantial financial burden – especially for own-account self-employed and small 
entrepreneurs. 
In spring 2001, the German government agreed on a structural pension reform, 
which aims to stabilise contribution rates over the long term. Government subsidisation 
of private pension schemes was introduced in the form of the so-called Riester pension. 
Individuals saving for old age received these subsidies in the form of government 
bonuses and tax exemptions. Most self-employed are excluded from the Riester subsidy, 
however, which is only granted to persons insured under the statutory system and to 
civil servants. Self-employed workers can only receive the subsidy if they pay 
mandatory contributions to the state pension fund. 
However, since the introduction of the new “Rürup pension” in 2005, the 
government has been able to subsidise private retirement pension schemes that can also 
be availed of by the self-employed. The Rürup pension is particularly attractive for self-
employed workers who are not subject to mandatory pension insurance. Against the 
background of the abolition of tax relief for life insurance policies, this is the only 
possibility for the self-employed to enjoy tax concessions when saving for their old age. 
                                                                                                                                               
the statutory health insurance system, the reference value amounts to a uniform € 2,450 (data from the 
Bavarian State Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, and Family and Women’s Affairs, cf. 
http://www. stmas.bayern.de/fibel/sf_b145.htm, consulted on 10.9.2006).  
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4.3 The grey area between self-employment and dependent 
employment  
As the observations thus far have shown, an individual’s employment status is of central 
importance for his/her social risk management, for it not only determines the 
applicability of certain labour legislation, such as regulations on occupational safety and 
health, but also access to insurance against social risks within the framework of 
statutory insurance systems. There is a danger that workers who cannot be classified 
unambiguously in one employment status might be excluded from certain social 
benefits and labour rights (Böheim/Muehlberger 2006; Burchell et al. 1999).  
In Germany, the distinction between dependent employees and the self-employed is 
particularly significant in this respect. Numerous self-employed are excluded from the 
statutory systems of social insurance here, while in the UK they are covered in 
principle, but are nonetheless excluded from the systems for unemployment insurance 
and the additional earnings-related state pension. That said, their social insurance 
contributions are relatively low. In both countries, it is more convenient for a contractor 
if an employee or freelance collaborator is classed under the employment status of “self-
employed”, assuming the contractor’s only aim is to save on social insurance 
contributions and curtail labour rights. In both countries, therefore, the problem of 
“bogus self-employment” or “dependent self-employment” is rife. 
In the context of an empirical study on the classification of employment 
relationships, Burchell et al. (1999) estimate that around 30% of workers in the UK 
have an ambiguous employment status, that is, they cannot be clearly assigned either to 
the category of self-employed or to the category of dependent employee. 
More recent reforms of UK labour law attempted to also take account of the 
intermediate status of “dependent self-employment” by establishing the category of 
“worker” (Freedland 2003: 22–26). Under this approach, legislation pertaining, for 
example, to working time, protection against discrimination of the disabled at the 
workplace or minimum wage conditions no longer apply only to dependent employees, 
rather they must be applied to all contractual relationships whereby individuals supply 
their own labour without running their own business (Böheim/Muehlberger 2006: 6; 
Freedland 2003). The Employment Relations Act of 1999 provides for the transferral of 
labour rights to categories of workers who have not benefited from them to date 
(Böheim/Muehlberger 2006: 7). While it is true that on the basis of this legal position 
the quasi self-employed are granted more labour rights on principle, the increased 
consideration given to the concept of “worker” in the legislation still leaves many 
aspects ambiguous. Thus, it cannot yet be foreseen which criteria the labour courts will 
ultimately apply in order to draw a distinction between a dependent “worker” and an 
independent self-employed individual (Böheim/Muehlberger 2006: 7). 
The problem of the expanding grey area between dependent employment and self-
employment became a subject of discussion in Germany mainly in the context of the 
debate initiated in the 1990s by the trade unions regarding what was termed “bogus self-
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employment”. This debate led to reforms of the framework conditions for self-
employment within the context of social insurance law. The background for the 
legislative initiative behind these reforms was the increasingly frequent transformation 
of dependent employment relationships into quasi-self-employment arrangements that 
were not subject to mandatory social insurance. In addition to the resulting lack of 
social insurance for these self-employed, this development was of course also 
accompanied by a loss in revenue for the social insurance funds. 
The response of Germany’s legislators to this growing problem was the “Law on 
Adjusting Social Insurance and on Guaranteeing Employee Rights” of 19.12.1998 
(known as the Adjustment Act). The aim of this law was to define the status of self-
employment more rigidly in order to counteract the transformation of regular 
employment relationships into bogus self-employment arrangements. However, only a 
year later, these regulations were significantly relaxed by the “Law on Promoting Self-
Employment” of 20.12.1999 (new regulations introduced in 2000). 
The German Pension Insurance Federation still carries out a “procedure for the 
determination of occupational status”, which is intended to verify or clarify a worker’s 
status under social security law, that is, whether the activity in question constitutes 
dependent employment or self-employment. However, proving the existence of (bogus) 
self-employment in the sense of producing legal evidence is likely to be difficult for the 
German Pension Insurance Federation, and especially so in borderline cases. All in all, 
the legislation on so-called bogus self-employment appears to be neither consistent nor 
easily explicable. The legislators’ original aim of implementing a sustainable, restrictive 
regulation of bogus self-employment was not achieved and is now no longer vigorously 
pursued (Betzelt 2006: 31). In fact, under new labour market policy schemes to promote 
self-employment, the responsible bodies no longer even carry out the procedure for the 
determination of occupational status.  
4.4 Collective interest representation  
As touched upon in the last section, social policy has begun to move in a new direction 
in Germany in recent years – away from combating (bogus) self-employment and 
towards promoting small-scale self-employment (Schulze Buschoff 2005). Likewise in 
the UK, self-employment is being promoted through labour market policy schemes and 
tax incentives (Harvey 2003). Not only is the number of self-employed increasing as a 
consequence of this political orientation, but the range of their potential economic and 
social circumstances is also growing. So what does this development now mean for 
collective social risk management, for example through established interest groups? 
The own-account self-employed, in particular, do not fit into the traditional 
corporatist structures of interest representation through which, on the one hand, the 
interests of employers are represented in employers’ associations and, on the other, the 
interests of employees are represented by trade unions. Own-account workers are 
neither employers nor employees and therefore cannot by accommodated by this 
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system. On the other hand, however, own-account workers rely on selling their labour 
just as dependent employees do, and are therefore exposed to social risks. Indeed, 
because of their employment status they actually have fewer social and labour rights 
than dependent employees, while at the same time they are subject to business risks. It 
can therefore be assumed that they have a need for social risk management through 
collective interest representation. 
This development entails a risk of further disempowerment for the established 
representatives of collective interests, however. When core workforces are outsourced 
out of companies in order to carry out the very same activity with the status of self-
employed worker (as often happens in the construction sector), then trade unions lose 
their clientele. When new areas of activity develop – for example in the IT service 
sector – that are pursued by own-account workers, then the latter usually have little 
sense of company loyalty or professional solidarity, and this, too, makes organisation in 
a trade union more difficult. The heterogeneity of the economic and social situations of 
the self-employed renders it generally difficult for established interest groups and trade 
unions to recruit members and represent their interests. 
Notwithstanding these obstacles, individual European trade unions have become 
increasingly active as regards organising those workers, especially, whose status lies in 
the grey area between dependent employment and self-employment. Leading the field 
here are the trade unions that represent freelance media workers and artists. 
The media sector represents an exception in this sense in Germany, too. Traditional 
trade union strategies such as setting standards for working conditions have been 
transposed to the new clientele of the “new self-employed” at least in the area of the 
media economy. In addition, a comprehensive system of information and service 
provision has been made available via Internet and telephone to self-employed union 
members. 
This policy of interest representation for freelance workers in the media sector has 
its roots in the IG Medien trade union, which now continues to operate as part of ver.di, 
the Unified Service Sector Union. IG Medien was involved, for example, in the 
establishment of legislation on price control in the area of sub-contracting ((§12 of the 
Collective Agreements Act). Under this regulation, collective contracts can be 
negotiated for quasi-dependent freelancers, specifying periods of notice, continued 
payment of remuneration in the event of illness, and other similar binding rights. To 
date, such collective contracts have been agreed exclusively in the media sector – first 
and foremost for public television and radio stations and for daily newspapers 
(Buchholz 2002: 122). IG Medien had negotiated with contractors on fees per line and 
other payments and had organised a comprehensive supply of training and advice to 
freelance workers (Reindl 2000: 430). This same work is being successfully continued 
in ver.di. The interest-group politics pursued by ver.di still mainly concerns self-
employed workers in the media sector. 
In the UK, too, it is the trade unions in the media and art sectors that are the 
pioneers with respect to the organisation of self-employed workers. Here, the National 
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Union of Journalists (NUJ), the Broadcasting Entertainment Cinematograph and 
Theatre Union (BECTU) and Equity (the British actors’ union) also represent self-
employed workers and workers in general who are in the twilight zone between 
dependent employment and self-employment. They have negotiated collective 
agreements with individual employers (e.g., regarding minimum wage conditions) that 
also apply to (dependent) self-employed. The British trade union for the construction 
industry (the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians, UCATT) also has a 
large number of self-employed members (Böheim/Muehlberger 2006: 9).  
The strategy the trade unions use to recruit (dependent) self-employed workers is to 
offer special services such as insurance, legal advice and assistance in drawing up 
contracts. The example of the (dependent) self-employed shows that the trade unions in 
both countries have slowly begun to open their doors to non-standardised employment 
relationships by not limiting their activities to traditional trade union instruments 
(collective bargaining, influencing working conditions) and instead extending their 
repertoires so as to also offer services that meet the needs of atypical workers 
(Muehlberger 2004; Böheim/Muehlberger 2006: 9). 
However, in the area of tailor-made services for atypical workers, the unions also 
have some serious competitors, for new organisations are also being established that 
offer interest representation and advice in a more market-oriented form. The non-
aligned Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), which was founded in 1974 and 
currently has 185,000 members, is considered the biggest organisation and interest 
group representing the self-employed in the UK. Members are entitled to a 
comprehensive package of services, including legal and financial advice, insurance 
services, and Internet access. The memberships subscription rate is based on the number 
of employees in the company, so the annual subscription rate is lowest for own-account 
self-employed. The FSB also engages in political lobbying by representing the interests 
of the self-employed in the political dialogue.10 Other interest groups of this kind 
represent the interests of specific occupational groups (e.g., the UK Web Design 
Association, the London Criminal Courts Solicitors’ Association (LCCSA), and the 
Independent Midwives Association), of women (e.g., the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association), or of regions (e.g., the Nottingham National Association of Self-
Employed). 
In Germany, too, in addition to the professional chambers (e.g., Chamber of 
Physicians, Chamber of Pharmacists, Chamber of Agriculturists), there is a vast number 
of organisations and lobbies for self-employed workers, many specialising in start-up 
and financial consultancy (e.g., Weiberwirtschaft e.V., a women’s cooperative; Bremer 
Existenzgründungsinitiative B.E.G.I.N. and Existenzgründungsoffensive ego, which 
both represent new entrepreneurs; and Matrix GmbH, a consultancy for small and 
medium-sized businesses). 
One shortcoming with respect to the social risk management strategies of the 
organisations that are geared more towards the professions is the fact that their lobbying 
                                                 
10 Cf. http://www.fsb.org.uk/data/default.asp?id=31&loc=policy, consulted on 2.2.2006. 
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is mainly concerned with improving the individual market positions of their self-
employed members and less with covering them against their increased social risks. As 
became clear in expert discussions with representatives of the associations that represent 
the interests of the self-employed, “the dominant ideal in the associations is that of 
professions characterised by meritocracy, in which inadequate coverage against risks 
such as illness, old age or lack of contracts is par for the course and can only be dealt 
with on the basis of private resources” (Betzelt 2006: 33).11  
5 Self-employment and private risk management  
5.1 Subjective estimates of the adequacy of statutory pensions  
In addition to social insurance and collective interest representation through trade 
unions and professional associations as two levels at which collective risk management 
is provided, there is also the question of individual risk management on the part of the 
“new self-employed”. This section will discuss whether and to what extent the self-
employed in the two countries feel that statutory schemes insure them against the risk of 
old age and in which ways they provide themselves for their old age, where applicable. 
Table 2:  Based on the statutory pension you will receive on retirement, do you think you 
will find it … 
Germany United Kingdom 
Adequacy of 
statutory pension Dependent 
employees 
Self-
employed 
Dependent 
employees 
Self-
employed 
…extremely difficult to 
get by? 15.3 % 22.5 % 31.3 % 46.8 % 
…difficult to get by? 44.2 % 33.5 % 40.5 % 36.7 % 
…easy to get by? 21 % 19.7 % 8.2 % 2.8 % 
…very easy to get by? 1 % 2.5 % 1.6 % 0 % 
Don’t know 18.5 % 21.9 % 18.4 % 13.8 % 
Pearson chi-square test Difference significant at 10% level Difference not significant 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001); author’s calculations. 
None (0.0%) of the self-employed in the UK believe they will find it “very easy to get 
by” on their state pension, and only 2.8% believe they will find it “easy to get by”. 
Almost half (46.8%) of the self-employed believe that they will find it “extremely 
difficult to get by” on their state pension, while 36.7% expect it will be “difficult to get 
                                                 
11 The trade union ver.di, by contrast, has included the lack of social security for the self-employed in 
its agenda (Betzelt 2004). 
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by”. A large share (13.8%) of the self-employed are uncertain about their financial 
future. 
In Germany, no less than every fifth self-employed worker (21.9%) responded 
“Don’t know” to the question as to how well they would manage to get by on their 
statutory pension. The relatively large share of respondents in the “don’t know” 
category suggests that they lack adequate information. Those who do make an 
assessment are, however, generally more optimistic than their colleagues in the UK. 
While in Germany, too, only 2.5% of the self-employed believe they will find it “very 
easy to get by” on their state pension, a more generous every fifth respondent (19.7%) 
believes it will be “easy to get by”. On the other hand, 22.5% of the self-employed 
believe it will be “extremely difficult to get by”, compared to 33.5% of the self-
employed in Germany, who expect to find it “difficult to get by”. 
These data are of course subjective estimates on the part of the respondents and 
must be interpreted as such. The results of the survey must also be qualified by the fact 
that the self-employed often lack basic knowledge about their provisions for their old 
age (Dräther et al. 2001). In contrast to the comprehensive study carried out in Germany 
on the retirement income situation of dependent employees (AVID 1996: “Provision for 
Old Age in Germany”), there is currently no comparative, systematic evaluation of the 
income situation of self-employed retirees with which the objective situation could be 
reliably described.12  
5.2 Individual solutions in Germany and the UK  
Table 3 (p. 19) clearly illustrates the relative significance of state, company and private 
forms of provision for old age for the self-employed compared to dependent employees 
in both countries. Asked which will probably be their most important source of income 
in old age, three quarters of dependent employees in Germany (75.1%) name their 
“statutory annuity or pension”. Although only around a quarter of the self-employed in 
Germany are covered by mandatory pension insurance systems, 40.6% also name their 
“statutory annuity or pension” as their most important source of retirement income. A 
large share of the self-employed are eligible for pension payments on the basis of 
voluntary membership in the statutory pension insurance system and on the basis of 
entitlements deriving from previous dependent employment relationships. 
                                                 
12 The AVID Report indicates that self-employed individuals with pension rights under the statutory 
pension system usually have these rights on the basis of previous phases of insured employment. 
However, these entitlements are partly supplemented by rights under other mandatory insurance 
systems, such as pension insurance for agriculturists or pension schemes provided through a 
professional association (VDR 2000: 20). Moreover, self-employed individuals who have 
entitlements under the statutory pension insurance system have acquired above-average entitlements 
under private schemes (an average € 301 for women and € 568 for men in western Germany; see 
VDR 2000: 95). However, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the accumulated entitlements 
from the statutory system and other mandatory insurance systems or private pension schemes.  
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In the UK, both dependent employees and the self-employed are subject to 
mandatory insurance in the same statutory pension system. However, only a quarter of 
each group believe that their entitlements from statutory pension insurance will 
probably represent their most important source of income in old age (27.7% of 
dependent employees and 26.3% of the self-employed). 
Company pension schemes are the most important type of provision for the 
majority of dependent employees, while private pension plans are most significant for 
the majority of the self-employed. Thus, 39.9% of dependent employees name company 
pensions as probably their most important source of income in old age (compared to 
13.5% of the self-employed), while 53.6% of the self-employed name private pension 
plans as their most important source of income (compared to 20.9% of dependent 
employees). 
In Germany, by contrast, company pension plans play hardly any role whatsoever, 
at least as regards being the most important source of income in old age (1.5% of 
dependent employees and 2.6% of the self-employed name such schemes as their most 
important income source). Similar to the UK, Germany’s self-employed also mainly 
count on private provision for old age. This is named as probably the most important 
source of retirement income by half of the self-employed (compared to only 16.2% of 
dependent employees). 
Table 3: Which of the following will probably be your most important source of 
income in old age? 
Germany United Kingdom Most important 
source of retirement 
income Dependent 
employees 
Self-
employed 
Dependent 
employees 
Self-
employed 
State annuity or pension 75.1 % 40.6 % 27.7 % 26.3 % 
Company retirement 
pension 1.5 % 2.6 % 39.9 % 13.5 % 
Private pension plan* 16.2 % 50 % 20.9 % 53.6 % 
Other** 2.1 % 2.9 % 1.2 % 3.8 % 
Don’t know 5.1 % 4 % 10.3 % 2.8 % 
Pearson chi-squared test Difference significant at 1% level 
Difference significant at 1% 
level 
*This term includes the following categories: private retirement pensions, long-term savings 
(life assurance) / income from savings or other capital (shares, bonds, etc.) / income from land 
or property (i.e., income from rental, etc.). 
**This term includes the following categories: income from other employment /social welfare / 
support in money or in kind from relatives or family members. 
Figures in italics indicate less than five expected frequencies in the cell in question. 
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001); author’s calculations. 
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6 Summary 
This paper began with an account of the evolution of self-employment in the UK and 
Germany. It became clear here that after decades of decline, a renaissance of self-
employment can now be observed in both countries. In the UK, the noticeable growth in 
self-employment began in the early 1980s, came to a temporary halt at the beginning of 
the 1990s – when some years brought stagnating or even slightly decreasing shares – 
and then began rising noticeably again in 2001. In Germany, the renaissance of self-
employment only began ten years later, in other words at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Here, the upward trend for self-employment is still continuing unabated – nurtured not 
least by active labour market policy measures such as “Me, Inc.” business start-up 
grants and bridging allowances for new entrepreneurs. 
One result of the comparison between the UK and Germany is that in both 
countries the self-employment boom has concerned a large share of people who do not 
have the profile of the traditional self-employed entrepreneur or small business owner. 
Entries into “new self-employment” more often come from unemployment, are found in 
the service sector and are characterized by low capital requirements and low entry 
barriers. In both countries, a high level of dynamism – that is, frequent transitions into 
and out of self-employment into and out of other forms of employment – as well as the 
risk of a precarious and low income are characteristic for the new self-employment. 
In the UK, the self-employed are enrolled in and dealt with in the state social 
security systems in a similar way to dependent employees, except that they are excluded 
from the additional state earnings-related pension. The self-employed in the UK 
basically enjoy similar conditions to dependent employees with respect to many social 
security benefits. The universalistic and tax-financed British National Health Service 
covers the health care of all residents of the UK, irrespective of their employment 
status. In the event of a transition between dependent employment and self-
employment, there is no need to change health-care system. There are differences when 
it comes to the additional state pension system, which excludes the self-employed, and 
the way in which income is calculated in means tests. Moreover, in contrast to 
dependent employees, the risk of unemployment or a lack of contracts is not covered by 
the UK social security systems. 
Although the self-employed in the UK are subject to mandatory insurance under 
the basic pension system and are eligible for a small retirement pension, Meager and 
Bates (2001) fear that the increase in new self-employment since the 1980s will lead to 
a growing number of self-employed who will be faced in later life with uncertainty and 
relative poverty. This is a consequence, on the one hand, of the exclusion of the self-
employed from the additional state pension system and, on the other, of the low and 
irregular incomes typical of this labour market sector. 
In addition, the level of state coverage is very low. Only barely 3% of the self-
employed (and less than 10% of the dependent employed) in the UK believe that they 
will find it “easy” or “very easy” to get by on their state retirement pension. In order to 
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maintain their standard of living, the self-employed – just like dependent employees – 
are forced to rely on company or private pension plans. Against the background of 
irregular and low incomes described above and the resulting low capacity for saving, 
the self-employed face particular problems in this respect. 
The German social security systems, by contrast, offer individuals a relatively high 
degree of protection and insurance against social risks. When applied to the self-
employed, however, this is only true to a limited extent, or only for certain categories of 
self-employed. In contrast to the classical “old” self-employed such as artisans or 
institutionalised liberal professionals, many of the “new” self-employed, especially 
own-account workers, generally do not belong to any kind of corporate structure and do 
not enjoy the welfare-state mitigation of market risks which is typical for the German 
employment system (Gottschall/Betzelt 2003). Labour and social law opens up scope 
here for the emergence of precarious and unprotected forms of employment beyond the 
parameters of the standard employment relationship. 
On some self-employed are covered on the basis of special regulations by the 
solidaristic, pay-as-you-go state system of social security. There are currently 
mandatory special schemes under the statutory retirement insurance system for around a 
quarter of the self-employed, e.g. midwives, agriculturists, coastal mariners and coastal 
fishers. The majority of the self-employed are not subject to any kind of mandatory 
social insurance whatsoever, despite the fact that many of them – just like dependent 
employees – rely on selling their labour and frequently earn less substantial and less 
regular incomes than the former. Social policy reform is needed in order to insure these 
self-employed against social risks as working life and life circumstances in general 
become increasingly flexible (Betzelt 2004; Betzelt/Fachinger 2004). There is therefore 
widespread demand in Germany for the mandatory integration of all self-employed into 
the social insurance systems (Bieback 2001; Betzelt/Fachinger 2004; Schulze Buschoff 
2005).13  
The conditions of social insurance for the self-employed vary greatly from one 
occupational group to another. While there is a large share of self-employed who are not 
covered by the statutory insurance systems, there are also self-employed workers who 
consider themselves very well covered by the state systems. Thus, a hefty almost 22% 
of the self-employed in Germany believe that they will find it “easy” or “very easy” to 
get by on the statutory pension they will receive on retirement.14 These are self-
employed workers who are covered by mandatory special regulations or who also pay 
voluntary contributions to statutory pension insurance. 
                                                 
13 A positive and important step in this direction is the fact that since February 2006 all self-employed 
in Germany now have the possibility for the first time of remaining in the unemployment insurance 
system on a voluntary basis and at favourable conditions.  
14 This statement must, however, be qualified by the observance that respondents might over-estimate 
the amount of their expected pension. The average amounts (mean value) of retirement income paid 
from statutory pension insurance in western Germany in 2001 was € 983 for men and € 456 for 
women (Schmähl et al. 2005: 15; also see Section 5.1 of this paper).  
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Nonetheless, individual risk strategies are of paramount importance amongst the 
self-employed in both countries. Thus, 50% of the self-employed in Germany and 54% 
of their counterparts in the UK expect that private forms of insurance will probably 
represent their most important source of income in old age. Amongst dependent 
employees, only 16% have this expectation in Germany and only 21% have it in the 
UK. 
In Germany, since 2002, self-employed workers who pay contributions to 
mandatory statutory insurance can save for old age with the aid of tax concessions on 
the basis of the Riester pension rule; the same applies since 2005 under the Rürup 
pension rule to self-employed workers who are not subject to mandatory pension 
insurance. Individual risk strategies are therefore favoured by the state and are likely to 
gain in significance in the future. In the UK, the importance of private pension plans 
was significantly increased thanks to regulatory measures promoting private provision 
(contracting out).15 Increased privatisation of provision for old age must not be equated 
with a withdrawal on the part of the state as long as the latter intervenes with regulatory 
measures – as is the case with contracting out and the Riester and Rürup pensions. 
Instead it is fair to speak of a blurring of the boundaries between state and private 
provision, or of a hybridisation of “private” old-age pension insurance (Marschallek 
2005: 429). Individual and collective risk management strategies are becoming 
intermeshed. 
In the area of collective interest representation, “hybrids” are also developing 
between the established and traditional types of representation through trade unions and 
more market-oriented forms of interest representation (Gottschall/Kroos 2003). Rising 
memberships in many organisations and associations that represent the self-employed 
show that there is most certainly a need for collective organisation. The risk strategy of 
collective organisation could represent a useful supplement to individual risk strategies, 
which are currently the dominant response of the self-employed to future risks. Whether 
and to what extent this development will succeed should be examined for each 
individual (occupational) area so as to do justice to the full range of economic and 
social circumstances experienced by the self-employed. 
                                                 
15 This development mainly concerns dependent employees, however. The self-employed are excluded 
from the additional state pension system and therefore also from the possibility of contracting out.  
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